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Abstract
The primary goal of this article is to examine the infl uence of relative vs. individ-
ual risk preference in educational choice. To do so, we discuss relative risk prefer-
ence in prospect theory and in sociological models of educational choice and de-
bate the notable but widely neglected importance of individual risk preferences 
for educational plans and decisions. We analyze these diff erent forms of risk pref-
erence and demonstrate how they infl uence the intentions for further education of 
students attending Gymnasium, the academically oriented secondary school track 
in Germany. Using data collected from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) youth questionnaire in the years 2003 to 2012, we fi nd not only that stu-
dents from a higher socio-economic background are less sensitive to their school 
performance but also that their individual risk preferences are completely irrele-
vant to their educational plans. The opposite applies to students from a lower so-
cio-economic background: the more risk-averse they are, the less likely they are 
to opt for a university degree. Most importantly, we fi nd support for the notion 
of relative risk-seeking in upper social classes and relative risk aversion in low-
er classes.
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Bildungsentscheidungen und Risikopräferenzen: Zur 
Relevanz relativer und individueller Risikopräferenzen
Zusammenfassung
Der Einfl uss von individueller und relativer Risikopräferenz auf Bildungs inten-
tionen wird am Beispiel von Abiturienten diskutiert und empirisch untersucht. 
Ausgehend von der Prospekttheorie und soziologischen Modellen der Bildungs-
wahl argumentieren wir, warum zwischen individueller und relativer Risiko-
präferenz zu diff erenzieren ist und wie sich diese beiden Facetten auf Bildungs-
entscheidungen auswirken. Die empirische Überprüfung basiert auf Angaben 
17-jähriger Gymnasiasten, die im Rahmen des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels in den 
Jahren 2003 bis 2012 befragt wurden. Die multivariaten Analysen zeigen deut-
lich, dass der Einfl uss der individuellen Risikoaversion auf Bildungsabsichten 
nach der sozialen Herkunft variiert: Für Schüler aus privilegierten Familien ist 
die individuelle Risikopräferenz für die nachschulischen Ausbildungspläne irrele-
vant. Bei Schülern aus bildungsferneren Haushalten erweisen sie sich hingegen 
als signifi kanter Prädiktor: Je stärker risikosuchend diese Schüler sind, desto eher 
beabsichtigen sie die Aufnahme eines Studiums und vice versa. Die unterschied-
liche Relevanz von individuellen Risikopräferenzen – und auch der schulischen 
Leistungen – in Abhängigkeit von der sozialen Herkunft der Schüler sind ein indi-
rekter Beleg dafür, dass obere soziale Klassen aufgrund ihrer sozialstrukturellen 
Position risikosuchend, untere soziale Klassen hingegen risikoavers sind und so-
mit relative Risikopräferenzen nach der sozialen Herkunft variieren. 
Schlagworte
Bildungsungleichheit; Bildungsentscheidungen; Risikopräferenzen; Relative 
Risiko aversion; Tertiäre Bildung; Berufl iche Ausbildung
1.  Introduction
We focus on the role of risk preferences in educational choice, as previous sociolog-
ical research on risk aversion has made the misleading assumption that people of 
diff erent classes are universally risk-averse, and neglected important theoretical ar-
guments and fi ndings in other disciplines. The investigation and theoretical expla-
nation of risk preferences was pioneered by psychologists Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), who developed the now empirically well-estab-
lished prospect theory. This theory is used widely today in economics, where risk 
comes into play as an individual preference that infl uences decisions in various ar-
eas of life (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & ter Weel, 2008). The economic lit-
erature supports the idea that risk-averse behavior leads to lower educational in-
vestments, whereas risk-seeking behavior leads to higher educational investments 
(Brown, Ortiz-Nuñez, & Taylor, 2012; Weiss, 1972). 
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The sociological model of educational choice by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) 
also incorporates risk aversion, which at fi rst suggests an affi  nity with prospect the-
ory. Although it was developed primarily to explain the persistence of social ine-
quality and the reduction in gender diff erences in educational attainment in in-
dustrialized countries over time, this model has also been used to explain social 
inequalities at a given point in time (Gabay-Egozi, Shavit, & Yaish, 2010; Stocké, 
2007). In the Breen and Goldthorpe model, which followed on the work of Boudon 
(1974), the authors distinguished between primary and secondary eff ects of social 
origin and identifi ed the motive of status maintenance as the main factor account-
ing for secondary eff ects. They argue that in striving to avoid downward status mo-
bility, families show a tendency toward risk aversion in educational choices. Our 
application of prospect theory to educational decisions results in a more socio-eco-
nomically diff erentiated view, revealing that risk-averse behavior is more prevalent 
among lower socio-economic classes, whereas risk-seeking behavior is more preva-
lent among higher socio-economic classes.
Making reference to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and models 
of educational choice (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Goldthorpe, 1996), we explore 
diff erences in relative and individual risk preferences and the socio-economic back-
ground conditions under which individual risk preference might aff ect students’ in-
tentions to pursue university or other forms of vocational or higher education af-
ter completion of secondary school. We argue that the motive of status mainte-
nance is the major force driving educational decision-making, leading to relative 
risk-seeking in higher classes and relative risk aversion in lower classes. Individual 
risk aversion comes into play particularly for students from lower socio-econom-
ic backgrounds, since these students normally tend to maintain their status at an 
earlier stage in the educational career than higher-class students and thus to avoid 
risky decisions. Thus, the assumption that people from all social classes are univer-
sally risk-averse is misleading, because risk aversion is not a key factor in decision 
making for upper social classes.
In our study, we tested theoretically derived hypotheses based on empirical 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). We analyzed the ed-
ucational intentions of students who were about to graduate from upper second-
ary school (Gymnasium), the university-oriented track of the German school sys-
tem, and to thereby obtain their general university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur). 
School-leavers with an Abitur show disparities in their intentions as well as in their 
subsequent educational participation: After graduating from Gymnasium, students 
from lower social classes enroll less often in university, as fi rm-based apprentice-
ships are widely accepted in these social groups as an alternative to a university de-
gree (Allmendinger, 1989; Müller & Shavit, 1998). 
In the following section, we briefl y describe the German educational system and 
then derive hypotheses based on prospect theory, models of educational choice and 
concepts of individual risk preference. After describing our data, operationalization 
and statistical methods, we give a detailed presentation of the empirical results. 
In the fi nal section, we summarize our fi ndings, point out some limitations of the 
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study and conclude with remarks on the importance of considering preferences, at-
titudes and personality in inequality research.
2.  The German educational system
The German educational system is characterized by high stratifi cation, high stand-
ardization and high occupational specifi city (Allmendinger, 1989; Müller & Shavit, 
1998; Pfeff er, 2008). The high stratifi cation forces students to make decisions at 
multiple points in their educational career, thereby increasing the importance of 
risk preferences in the German educational system as compared to educational sys-
tems with low stratifi cation.
In most of the 16 German federal states, the fi rst point at which students are 
separated into tracks is in primary school, at the end of the fourth grade. The three 
main types of secondary school in Germany are lower secondary school, intermedi-
ate secondary school and upper secondary school, the latter of which (Gymnasium) 
is a university-oriented track. The Gymnasium is the most demanding and long-
est-lasting general educational track at the secondary level. Students graduating 
from these schools obtain the university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur). They can 
choose from among three main types of vocational and higher education: (1) uni-
versity (Universität), (2) university of applied sciences (Fachhochschule) and (3) a 
vocational education and training (VET) program within the ‘dual system’ (duales 
System) or full-time vocational school. In addition, we observe that signifi cant pro-
portions of students (4) fi rst complete a VET program and then begin a degree at a 
university or university of applied sciences, thus obtaining a dual qualifi cation (for 
a condensed overview of the German educational system, see Figure 1).
Due to the high stratifi cation of the educational system and the attractiveness 
of the German VET system, Germany has a very low percentage of the population 
with tertiary degrees compared to most other industrialized countries (Powell & 
Solga, 2011), although the percentage of secondary school graduates who are eli-
gible for tertiary education has steadily increased in recent years. For Gymnasium 
graduates who were raised in lower- or middle-class families or by parents who did 
not attend university, VET off ers attractive opportunities to gain practical occupa-
tional qualifi cations: vocational training programs are generally shorter in dura-
tion, lasting from two to three years, and off er a practical orientation and a high 
probability of employment (Reimer & Pollak, 2010). Additionally, apprentices re-
ceive a salary while still in training (in the case of in-house apprenticeship accom-
panied by part-time vocational school) under the German dual system. Despite the 
fact that a vocational degree is a signifi cantly lower qualifi cation than a universi-
ty degree, such degrees off er relatively stable labor market returns without the fi -
nancial burdens and risks of university studies (Schindler & Reimer, 2011). These 
attractive aspects of vocational training tend to divert especially those individuals 
from tertiary education who have no more than an average probability of graduat-
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ing from university (Becker & Hecken, 2009). And for the same reasons, it might 
attract risk-averse individuals.
3.  Theories and empirical fi ndings on risk preference 
in educational choice
Risk preferences are expressed on a scale ranging from risk-averse to risk-seeking 
behavior. We focus on two aspects of risk preferences: The fi rst relates to a cur-
rent situation (position), and is therefore referred to as ‘relative risk preference’, 
the second to personal attitudes, and is referred to as ‘individual risk preference’. 
The following section explains the theoretical relevance of these two forms of risk 
preference in educational decisions and the interaction between them. We argue 
that the motive of status maintenance is the pivotal force in educational choices, 
leading to relative risk aversion in lower classes and relative risk-seeking in high-
er classes. Since students from lower social classes normally tend to maintain their 
status at an earlier stage in the education system than higher-class students and 
thus tend to avoid risky decisions, individual risk aversion comes into play espe-
cially for those students from lower social classes.
Figure 1:  Schematic structure of the German education system and the transitions under 
study (arrows)
Note. Dotted arrows: fi rst transitions after receiving general university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur); 
Solid lines: transitions to tertiary education after “detour”. 
Source: own illustration.
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To this end, we start by discussing aspects of prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) and models of educational choice in the version of Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997; Goldthorpe, 1996). Slightly diff erent versions have been pro-
posed by Erikson and Jonsson (1996), and by Esser (1999). In a second step, we 
focus on individual risk preferences and formulate hypotheses addressing both 
forms thereof.
3.1  Relative risk aversion and risk-seeking in prospect theory
Prospect theory aims at explaining decision under risk and may also be applied 
to decision under uncertainty1, as in the case of educational decisions. According 
to prospect theory, the decision process is divided into an editing and an evalua-
tion phase. Possible outcomes are evaluated relative to a reference point as gains or 
losses. As losses increase relatively to gains, the value function for losses and gains 
takes on an asymmetrical s-shaped form. Risk preference is a function of values at-
tached to gains and losses and of decision weights. 
In a fi rst step, the editing phase, people frame diff erent ‘prospects’, or off ers, 
as gains or losses relative to their current status. This procedure is referred to as 
‘coding’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Whereas coding is likely to play an insignif-
icant role in a simple lottery situation, where it is fairly clear what the potential 
gains and losses are, in sociologically relevant decisions, the same off er might have 
diff erent meanings to diff erent people depending on those individuals’ reference 
points. In the context of educational decisions, a VET degree might be considered 
a loss for an upper-class family, neither a loss nor a gain for a middle-class family, 
and a gain for a lower-class family. This idea is in line with Keller and Zavalloni’s 
(1964) as well as Boudon’s (1974) arguments about relative educational aspirations.
In a second step, people evaluate each of the edited prospects with respect to 
their probabilities and associated subjective utilities and then assign a value (V) to 
each prospect. The utility is the sum of the gains and losses, and follows from the 
divergence of each from the reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). After 
completing this process, people choose the prospect with the highest value. 
In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory assumes that people hold 
diff erent utility functions for losses and gains. In the area of losses, the function 
is convex; in the area of gains, it is concave. The curve is steepest in the case of 
lowest absolute outcomes. An additional increase in an already large gain leads 
to a smaller subjective utility than having either this additional outcome or noth-
1 Decision under risk means that probabilities are stated, under uncertainty, that ‘objec-
tive’ probabilities are not known to the decision maker or even do no t exist. As people do 
not operate with stated probabilities, but with subjective decision weights, the diff eren-
tiation between decision under risk and under uncertainty does not seem to be of major 
relevance (see also later versions of prospect theory developed by Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992).
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ing at all. The same holds true for losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992).
In the case of gains, for example, people often prefer an outcome that is cer-
tain to an uncertain lottery game outcome with a higher expected value. If you of-
fer a lottery of either V (€300, 0.50; €0, 0.50), in which the odds of winning €300 
or nothing at all are equal, or a certain payoff  of €130, the majority of people will 
opt for the certain outcome, although the statistically expected value of the lottery 
is €150 (Dohmen et al., 2005). Therefore, the average decision maker is risk-averse 
in this case. In contrast, if people face losses, they behave in a risk-seeking manner 
(for more examples, see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
What does this mean for educational decisions? If students and their families 
consider the value of diff erent educational alternatives in the editing phase, stu-
dents from the lowest classes encounter positive prospects, which would signify 
a maintenance of or increase in social status, whereas students from the highest 
classes would mainly face negative prospects, only one of which would off er the 
possibility to maintain social status. Lower-class students thus tend to be relatively 
risk-averse, whereas upper-class students are more risk-seeking.
To clarify the consequences for educational choices, we refer to our example: 
the educational choices of students with a general university entrance qualifi cation 
(Abitur) in Germany. The outcomes of the fi rst prospect are enrolling in universi-
ty and pursuing a degree (UNI) and in the case of failing, entering the labor mar-
ket without qualifi cations and being an unskilled worker (NOQ). The probability of 
success should be p, that of failing 1-p. Consequently, the prospect is V1(UNI, p; 
NOQ, 1-p). The alternative prospect is vocational education and training (VET). As 
the VET system traditionally attracts students who have completed lower or inter-
mediate secondary school, we assume a success probability of 1 for students who 
have completed upper secondary school (Gymnasium). The VET is considered as a 
certainty equivalent. The second prospect is V2(VET, 1). The value of the three dif-
ferent outcomes can be ordered into NOQ < VET < UNI.
We place the two prospects into the hypothetical value function separate-
ly for students from upper, middle and lower social classes, without assuming 
that the value function as such diff ers by class (see Figure 2). Students from up-
per social classes only maintain their family status if they enroll in universi-
ty. If they graduate, they neither gain nor lose. If they fail, they experience a se-
vere loss. If they choose the second prospect V2(VET, 1), they also sustain an in-
tergenerational status loss. The outcomes of all prospects are negative or zero 
(NOQ < VET < UNI = 0). This means that students from upper social classes 
should be relatively risk-seeking and should attend university in order to avoid a 
loss. The situation is completely diff erent for students from lower social classes. If 
they have attained the general university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur), they are 
already at least as qualifi ed as their parents or even more. They face no potential 
status loss but rather the opportunity to make gains. They are upwardly mobile 
whether they complete VET or university studies (0 = NOQ < VET < UNI). As uni-
versity is risky, they might prefer the certain alternative V2 although a higher val-
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ue is attached to a university degree. The outcomes of the prospects are positive or 
zero, and students are consequently relatively risk-averse. Note: aversion to inter-
generational status loss leads to risk-seeking behavior in the fi rst case and to risk-
aversion in the second case.
Figure 2:  Prospect theory and the value of educational alternatives ‘university’, ‘no voca-
tional qualifi cation’, ‘vocational education + training (vet)’
Note. NOQ: no vocational qualifi cation: UNI: university; VET: vocational education + training. 
Source: Own illustrations.
If students belong to a middle-class family, they could achieve the same status as 
their parents by completing VET. In this case, they neither gain nor lose from an 
intergenerational perspective. A university degree would be a gain, and failure to 
attain a university degree a loss (NOQ < VET = 0 < UNI). The outcomes of the fi rst 
prospect are thus mixed. In lottery experiments, people behave in a risk-averse 
manner when faced with mixed prospects consisting of both losses and gains. In 
a situation of equal odds of winning and losing, people only play the lottery if the 
positive outcome is at least twice as large as the absolute value of the negative out-
come (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In a situation of equally positive and negative 
outcomes, they play if the probability of winning is substantially higher. Otherwise, 
they choose the safe alternative of ‘neither winning nor losing’. In our example, 
this would be taking the VET course. 
3.2  Relative risk aversion and further important aspects of 
sociological models of educational choice
The aforementioned theoretical concepts and our application thereof are similar 
to sociological models of educational choice. These models are founded on the as-
sumption that preferences do not diff er due to class-specifi c values or socializa-
tion or that fi nancial returns to education are not evaluated diff erently by people 
of diff erent classes. However, the utility of educational investments diff er by fami-
Educational choice and risk preferences
107JERO, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2015)
lies, as both parents and children – when they have reached the age of making ed-
ucational decisions – try to avoid intergenerational downward mobility in socio-
economic status by ensuring that children attain at least the same social status as 
their parents (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Esser, 1999). 
Individuals from diff erent social classes are motivated more by the desire to avoid 
status loss than by the prospect of status advancement (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; 
see also Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Esser, 1999). The motive of status maintenance 
is structurally connected to the social position of the family: Failure in one track 
and the diff erent probabilities of reaching a higher social class lead to behavior 
that is referred to as relative risk aversion. The choice of university attendance may 
be risky because, in the event of failure, one faces entry into the unskilled labor 
market and a resulting low social status. While a university degree is almost the 
only means of maintaining social status for the upper social classes, families with 
lower and middle social status tend to opt for a shorter, less risky form of training. 
A range of empirical studies using adapted rational choice models support the rel-
ative risk aversion theory (Becker & Hecken, 2009; Breen & Yaish, 2006; Davies, 
Heinesen, & Holm, 2002; Jæger & Holm, 2012; Need & de Jong, 2001; Stocké, 
2007; Tieben, 2011; Tolsma, Need, & de Jong, 2010; van de Werfhorst & Hofstede, 
2007). 
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), who focused for the sake of clarity on the service-
class, working-class and underclass, deducted that service-class as well as work-
ing-class families have an “identical relative risk aversion: they want to avoid, for 
their children, any position in life that is worse than the one from which they start” 
(p. 238). What remains unclear is the risk aversion and decision-making behavior 
of students from the lowest classes. Is there always a fear or risk of downward mo-
bility? The literature following on the work of Breen and Goldthorpe has reiterat-
ed the idea that such models assume “classes do not diff er in relative risk aversion 
motivation” (Gabay-Egozi et al., 2010, p. 449; see also Stocké, 2007).
If classes did not in fact diff er in relative risk aversion motivation, risk aversion 
would be constant and would therefore be unsuitable to predict diff erent outcomes. 
It is therefore unsurprising that previous attempts to test relative risk aversion us-
ing children’s or parents’ responses to survey questions on their subjective impor-
tance on avoiding downward status mobility have not yielded any signifi cant re-
sults (see, e.g. the work of Gabay-Egozi et al., 2010; Stocké, 2007). 
A further question is whether the notion of relative risk aversion in models 
of educational choice is any diff erent than that of loss aversion in prospect theo-
ry. Note that prospect theory has a diff erentiated view of relative risk preference: 
Depending on parental status, families are either risk-averse or risk-seeking. As 
prospect theory seems more convincing in this respect, our hypotheses below will 
only refer to this theory. 
Important assumptions of the sociological models of educational choice, which 
are used in our model specifi cation, are the following:
Success probabilities vary with regard to the relationship between the par-
ents’ background and the child’s skills, knowledge and eff ort. Grades are the most 
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important and obvious indicator of a child’s performance. Success probabilities 
should therefore vary by grades (Erikson & Rudolphi, 2010). In addition, higher 
social classes rate their chances of successfully completing a demanding university 
degree higher than members of lower social classes do, even when their school per-
formance is low, possibly because higher-class children know they can still rely on 
their parents’ support in case of diffi  culties. It is also possible that highly educated 
parents instill the idea in their children that completion of a university education is 
not so much a question of intelligence as one of perseverance (Erikson & Jonsson, 
1996; Esser, 1999).
In order to remain in the educational system, lower social classes have to shoul-
der relatively high fi nancial burdens consisting of both direct and indirect costs. 
The absolute costs might be comparable between classes, but lower classes have 
more limited fi nancial resources and therefore higher relative and/or subjectively 
assessed costs (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996).
3.3  Individual risk preference in prospect theory and empirical 
fi ndings from economic research
The prospect theory on risk aversion and risk-seeking describes the average value 
functions. However, there are diff erences between subjects (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). Individual risk preference may be regarded as a personal attitude, which, 
alongside (school) performance and parental social status, aff ects the values as-
signed to diff erent educational opportunities and the expected success probabili-
ties. Thus, it is distinct from relative risk aversion in models of educational choice 
and from relative risk preference in prospect theory.
In the fi eld of economics, individual risk preference is an established con-
struct used to explain decisions in areas such as fi nancial investment, labor mar-
ket behavior and performance, and even health behavior (Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, 
Huff man, & Sunde, 2007; Borghans et al., 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011). Empirical 
studies have shown that individual risk preference correlates with education and 
labor market participation. Using data from the National Register of Scientifi c 
and Technical Personnel, Weiss (1972) investigated the infl uence of risk aversion 
on human capital investments and returns to education in a sample of university 
graduates. He detected a negative relationship: Even with a moderate increase in 
risk aversion, the incentive to invest in education decreases signifi cantly. In a study 
using data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Brown, Ortiz-
Nuñez, & Taylor (2012) found signifi cant positive correlations between the degree 
of risk preference and the level of formal education achieved. They also examined 
the relationship between adults’ risk preferences and investments in human cap-
ital, as well as the relationship between parents’ risk preferences and their chil-
dren’s results in standardized tests. The higher the parents’ risk tolerance, the bet-
ter the math and reading skills of their children. Wölfel & Heineck (2012) analyzed 
data from the SOEP, in which over 20,000 adults were interviewed about their risk 
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preferences in 2004, and did not fi nd any consistent pattern of parental risk atti-
tudes and child enrollment in secondary school types. According to Dohmen et al. 
(2011), people report on average higher risk preferences if their mother or father 
holds a higher school-leaving certifi cate. Taken together, these fi ndings give indica-
tions that individual risk preference is not distributed completely at random but it 
is socially structured to some degree.
Although not all reported fi ndings are consistent, it is important to consider the 
following mechanisms when examining the role of individual risk preference in in-
equality of educational opportunity. If higher risk preference leads to higher edu-
cational attainment and if risk preferences are transmitted from one generation to 
the next, the transmission of risk preference should be partly responsible for ine-
qualities in educational opportunities. Or to put it diff erently: A higher socio-eco-
nomic background leads to higher risk preference, and higher risk preference in 
turn raises the chances of higher educational attainment.
3.4  Hypotheses on educational intentions 
We argue that the interaction between relative and individual risk preference im-
pacts educational plans. While relative risk preference infl uences educational plans 
via the motive of status maintenance, individual risk preference impacts education-
al plans as a personal attitude. Yet, these mechanisms have to be considered joint-
ly: When future educational decisions are pending, individual risk preference only 
has an impact when status has already been maintained. Thus, individual risk aver-
sion does not come into play for students from higher social classes until they have 
reached the same high status as their parents. In contrast, students from lower so-
cial classes have reached their parents’ status, and here, individual risk aversion 
can have an impact. We derive the following hypotheses on relative and individual 
risk aversion and their interactions:
The more risk-averse an upper secondary school (Gymnasium) graduate is, the 
more reluctant this person will be to pursue a university degree (Hypothesis 1 on 
individual risk preference).
According to the motive of status maintenance, students from upper social 
classes are almost compelled to obtain a university degree. They are relatively risk-
seeking. Thus, other factors are rarely taken into account and individual risk pref-
erence is unimportant (Hypothesis 2a on relative risk preference).
Secondary school graduates from lower and middle social classes do not nec-
essarily need a university degree to maintain their status. They are relatively risk-
averse. Those who are individually risk-seeking will attend university, while those 
who are individually risk-averse will apply for vocational training or other non-uni-
versity courses (Hypothesis 2b on relative risk preference).
If relative risk preferences suppress or allow individual risk preference to in-
fl uence educational decisions, this should also apply to other features. According 
to sociological models of educational choice, school performance is an important 
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factor (see end of section 3.2). We therefore hypothesize that relative risk-seek-
ing in upper social classes should lead to an irrelevance of school performance in 
later decisions, whereas relative risk aversion in lower social classes should lead 
to a positive relationship between school performance and university enrollment 
(Hypotheses 3a and 3b on relative risk preference).
4.  Data and methods
For the empirical analyses, we used data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP). All members of a household who are at least 17 years old are in-
terviewed individually using a personal questionnaire. There is also a supplemen-
tary questionnaire for 17-year-olds including information on educational history, 
school performance and future plans (Wagner, Frick, & Schupp, 2007). The follow-
ing analyses are based mainly on responses to the supplementary questionnaire in 
the years 2003 to 2012. We pool the information collected in diff erent years, but 
every individual is taken into account only once. 
4.1  Sample and variables
Since the Gymnasium is the school track that prepares students for higher ter-
tiary education, we restrict the analysis to the 17-year-olds who were attending a 
Gymnasium at the time of the survey. These students are also close to fi nishing 
their general education and obtaining their Abitur.
The dependent variable is based on their responses to two questions: First, re-
spondents are asked: ‘In the future, do you intend to attain a vocational or univer-
sity degree?’ Those students answering ‘yes’ or ‘yes, maybe’ report their intended 
educational and occupational qualifi cations, with multiple answers being possible. 
From these data, we assign students to one of the fi ve ‘educational pathways’ that 
are captured in our dependent variable:
(0)  University (UNI);
(1)  University of applied sciences (UAS);
(2)  Vocational training and higher education: dual qualifi cation or undecided 
(DBL);
(3)  Vocational training: apprenticeship or full-time vocational course (VET);
(4)  No further training: no vocational qualifi cations (NOQ).
We distinguish between university and university of applied sciences because de-
grees from the latter are shorter in duration, more occupationally oriented, and 
curricula are more structured but generally lead to somewhat lower earnings and 
social status. Thus, studies at a university of applied sciences may be more attrac-
tive to lower- and middle-class young people. Students declaring intentions to pur-
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sue vocational training and tertiary education might intend to attain a sequential 
dual qualifi cation (fi rst VET, then a university degree). However, we cannot be sure 
whether students have really chosen this strategy or are still undecided about their 
plans for the future. Those students who answered ‘no’ to the fi rst question on in-
tentions to pursue a vocational or university degree were placed in the category ‘no 
further training’. 
We use intentions instead of actual transitions for at least three reasons. First, 
the aforementioned models deal with students’ intentions. It is quite possible that 
some students will be unable to realize their plans. If they do not get a place in the 
VET system, for instance, whether due to poor grades or stiff  competition, they 
might be ‘forced’ to enroll at university. Second, fi ndings based on panel data show 
a close link between secondary school graduates’ intentions and their later en-
rollment at university in Germany (Maaz & Watermann, 2010). Third, as a pan-
el study, the SOEP makes it possible to follow respondents over time. After end-
ing general education, however, young people have a high risk of dropping out of a 
household survey like the SOEP. And this might result in a highly selective sample 
if those enrolling at university are the same individuals who move out of their par-
ents’ homes.
To capture individual risk preference, we used respondents’ answers to the 
question ‘How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully pre-
pared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?’ The possible answers range 
from 0 ‘unwilling to take risks’ to 10 ‘fully prepared to take risk’. Dohmen et al. 
(2011) provide evidence that this question is a valid indicator for risk preference, 
fi rst, by using the data on over 20,000 participants from the 2004 wave of the 
SOEP, and second through an additional behavioral validation study with 450 par-
ticipants randomly sampled all over Germany and surveyed in their private house-
holds. Using the fi rst data set, they showed that the answer to the aforementioned 
general risk question correlates highly with reports on more domain-specifi c ques-
tions on risk preference referring to car driving, fi nancial issues, sports/leisure, job 
career, and health behavior. In addition, the answers to the general question corre-
late positively with stockholding in the household, with self-employment, smoking 
and doing sports, whereby reported risk preferences in the domain in question are 
more strongly correlated (e.g. reports on risk preference in health and actual smok-
ing). In the behavioral validation study, people were interviewed using the same 
personal questionnaire ordinarily used by the SOEP. One of the fi rst questions was 
on the general risk preference. After this interview, lasting about 20 minutes, peo-
ple were asked to take part in a lottery game. The interviewers off ered the par-
ticipants the prospect of winning 300€ or nothing with even odds: V(€300, 0.50; 
€0, 0.50). Then the interviewers off ered gradually increasing certainty equivalents, 
starting at €0, rising from €10 to fi nally €190. The point at which people stop play-
ing and take the safe amount of money indicates their level of individual risk pref-
erence. Dohmen et al. (2011) showed that the self-reported risk preference and the 
certainty equivalent in the lottery correlate highly. Thus the self-report item seems 
to be not only valid but also a time-effi  cient instrument.
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As an indicator of the family’s social status, we used the highest paren-
tal level of education according to the scheme developed by the research group 
Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN; Braun 
& Müller, 1997). We diff erentiate between lower secondary school qualifi cation 
with or without vocational training (CASMIN 1), intermediate school qualifi ca-
tion or higher university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur) with or without vocation-
al training (CASMIN 2), degree from a university of applied sciences (CASMIN 3a) 
and university degree (CASMIN 3b). We diff erentiate between CASMIN 3a and 
CASMIN 3b, the latter being the “traditional” and more prestigious one and com-
prising those qualifi cations that lead to the highest positions on the labor market 
(see above). 
A family’s fi nancial situation might limit the options available to them when 
making educational decisions. As an indicator of the resources available to fi nance 
a child’s higher education, we used the disposable household income. We fi rst ad-
justed this income information for purchasing power parity based on 2006 averag-
es. In a second step, we took into account that the same amount of income has dif-
ferent meanings depending on the size of the household. Thus, instead of calculat-
ing per capita income, we divided the income by the square root of household size. 
As income is right-skewed, we took the logarithm of this income measure. 
We measured school performance of students at Gymnasium level by grades in 
German, mathematics and fi rst foreign language on the last report card. The varia-
bles on individual risk preference, household income (ln) and grades are centered 
by their mean.
We also constructed variables for respondent’s gender, region of residence 
(Eastern vs. Western Germany) and a linear variable for year of observation, equat-
ing the survey year 2008 to 0.
4.2 Multiple imputation
Some variables have missing values due to item non-response or by design. Item 
non-response is a minor problem. In 21 out of 1,154 cases, a valid answer on future 
educational plans was missing. The variables for parental education and available 
household income2 have 1 or 2, the variable for grade point average 9 missing val-
ues (for more details, see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The question on risk prefer-
ence is not asked in the SOEP every year. In order to maintain a reasonable sample 
size, we relied on reports on risk preference at the ages of 17 and 18 and calculat-
ed the average of both. In over 97 % of the sample, at least one piece of informa-
tion on risk preference is available. There was no question on risk preference for 
2 The variable of household income is a special case. The SOEP data include fully imputed 
information on this variable, based on information from all members of the household 
and on a substantial amount of information on diff erent income sources, income levels 
as well as taxes and social insurance contributions. Consequently, the number of missing 
values is almost zero.
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17-year-olds interviewed in 2003, for 17- and 18-year-olds in 2005, and data on 
18-year-olds are not yet available for 2013, yielding 367 missing values by design. 
In an additional 32 cases, there is not any valid value due to item non-response 
or–more importantly–due to panel drop-out. 
For all missing values, we conducted multiple chained equation imputations. 
In the case of risk preference, we imputed missing values for 17- and 18-year-olds 
and used the interview provided and imputed values to calculate the average risk 
preference. We specifi ed a background model that included the variables from the 
subsequent analysis models and also the following information: satisfaction with 
school performance in the subjects of German, mathematics and fi rst foreign lan-
guage; individual grades in these three subjects (instead of the grade point aver-
age); two factors extracted from a principal components analysis on the beliefs 
about relevant factors in upward social mobility; involvement in musical activi-
ties; participation in competitive sports; frequency of reading for leisure; immigra-
tion background (fi rst and second generation); year of survey; existence of tuition 
fees at time of interview in the federal state (Bundesland). Using the Stata add-on 
program ‘ice’, we were able to generate a total of 100 complete datasets. The vari-
ance of the predicted missing values from the regression-based imputation was in-
creased by adding an error term from the posterior distribution and by random 
drawings of the regression coeffi  cients from their estimated distributions (Royston, 
2005).
4.3  Describing the sample: Bivariate statistics
After imputation, the dataset contained complete information on 1,154 students at 
upper secondary school (Gymnasium). Table 1 shows the educational plans of stu-
dents by all characteristics used in the multivariate analyses (for a distribution of 
these fi gures before imputation, including the amount of missing information, see 
Table A.1. in the Appendix).
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Table 1:  Frequency distribution and relative frequencies of diff erent intentions regarding 
further education (after imputation)
Frequency Proportion pursuing
UNI UAS DBL VET NOQ
Frequency distribution 1,154.0 737.9 90.3 142.2 119.1 64.5
Relative frequencies 100 % 64 % 8 % 12 % 10 % 6 %
Risk preferencea
< = 3.5 (very low) 139.6 67 % 7 % 11 % 10 % 5 %
4 to 5 395.2 60 % 9 % 14 % 13 % 5 %
6 254.0 66 % 8 % 11 % 9 % 6 %
7 215.3 67 % 6 % 13 % 7 % 7 %
> 7.5 (very high) 149.9 65 % 10 % 10 % 8 % 7 %
Parental education
CASMIN 1 75.0 56 % 11 % 8 % 18 % 7 %
CASMIN 2 396.3 51 % 10 % 17 % 17 % 5 %
CASMIN 3a 174.2 66 % 9 % 12 % 9 % 5 %
CASMIN 3b 508.5 74 % 6 % 10 % 5 % 6 %
Grade point averagea
< = 2.0 (excellent) 233.9 79 % 4 % 9 % 4 % 4 %
2.33-2.66 382.1 71 % 6 % 12 % 8 % 4 %
3.0-3.33 349.3 54 % 10 % 16 % 14 % 7 %
> = 3.66 (poor) 188.8 50 % 13 % 11 % 17 % 9 %
Household incomea
1st quartile 280.5 52 % 11 % 15 % 17 % 6 %
2nd quartile 295.4 60 % 11 % 12 % 12 % 5 %
3rd quartile 287.6 66 % 6 % 14 % 8 % 5 %
4th quartile 290.4 77 % 3 % 9 % 4 % 6 %
Region
West 908.0 67 % 8 % 11 % 8 % 6 %
East 246.0 52 % 9 % 17 % 17 % 5 %
Gender
Boy 545.0 66 % 9 % 10 % 9 % 6 %
Girl 609.0 62 % 7 % 14 % 12 % 5 %
Note. Source: SOEP 2003-2012. Own calculations relying on 100 completely imputed datasets. UNI: 
university; UAS: university of applied sciences; DBL: sequence of VET + tertiary education; VET: 
vocational education and training; NOQ: no further training. 
aPut into larger categories for descriptive statistic only. 
Overall, 64 % of the students reported that they intended to enroll at a universi-
ty (UNI), 8 % to enroll at a university of applied sciences (UAS), 12 % to obtain a 
dual qualifi cation or that they were still undecided (DBL), 10 % to pursue vocation-
al training (VET) and 6 % reported no intention to pursue any further formal train-
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ing after graduation (NOQ). For individual risk preference, there is no clear pattern 
in the bivariate statistics. Looking at parental education and disposable household 
income, we see that higher scores in these dimensions go hand in hand with more 
students reporting university and fewer reporting university of applied science and 
vocational training. Students with low-qualifi ed parents do not fi t this overall pat-
tern regarding their statements on DBL. The group of students with low-qualifi ed 
parents is small in absolute terms, which might cause this irregularity. For those 
students reporting no intentions for further training, we see some small fl uctua-
tions around the average. 
Students’ intentions vary strongly by school performance. In Germany, grades 
range between ‘1’ being the best and ‘6’ being the worst grade. The better the aver-
age grades, the stronger their intention to go to university, the weaker their inten-
tion to go to a university of applied sciences or to pursue VET. Better school per-
formance also reduces the likelihood that students will plan to abstain from further 
training. As regards dual qualifi cations or indecision, there is a non-linear relation-
ship, with the lowest percentages for both the highest- and the lowest-performing 
students. The diff erences in intentions by school performance might be due to pri-
mary eff ects. It should be kept in mind, however, that the German educational sys-
tem is highly stratifi ed (see Section 2). Children from lower social classes only en-
ter the academically oriented school type (Gymnasium) if their school performance 
is very high (Stocké, 2007). One can therefore raise the question whether the per-
formance of students at Gymnasium itself varies by social background. Research 
based on the 2000 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has 
shown only a slight negative correlation between social background and academic 
performance, namely test results, among students attending Gymnasium at the age 
of 15 in Germany (Baumert & Schümer, 2001). In our data, we observe grade point 
averages varying between 2.95 to 2.66 from CASMIN 1 to CASMIN 3b. This diff er-
ence is statistically signifi cant, but small in respect to content. 
The literature provides evidence that the children of highly educated parents are 
more risk-seeking than children of lower-educated parents on average (Dohmen et 
al., 2011). In our sample, the average risk preference increases from students with 
the lowest to the highest socio-economic background, from 5.39 to 5.74, but all dif-
ferences are not signifi cant.
5.  Empirical fi ndings on educational intentions: 
Multivariate results
As the dependent variable on further educational career is categorical with fi ve out-
comes, we estimated multinomial logit models (Long, 1997). The fi rst model refers 
to the whole sample (see Table 2). The coeffi  cient for the variable on individual risk 
preference is statistically signifi cant (at the 5 % level) for the equation vocation-
al training vs. university, indicating that risk-seeking individuals tend more often 
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to favor university and less often to take the shortest educational route, vocation-
al training. The three other coeffi  cients for risk preference (university of applied 
sciences, dual qualifi cation/undecided, and no further training vs. university) are 
close to zero and not signifi cant. As an indicator of relative risk aversion, we relied 
on parental education. Due to low case numbers, students with parents belonging 
to CASMIN 1 were grouped together with CASMIN 2, forming the reference catego-
ry. In three out of four equations, there are negative and statistically signifi cant ef-
fects for students whose parents are university graduates (CASMIN 3b), indicating 
a higher interest in university education and a lower interest in vocational training 
and education among this group compared to students with less-educated parents. 
The small group that reported no intention to pursue further education does not 
diff er with respect to parental education. For the grade point average, ranging from 
‘excellent’ to ‘poor’, four positive eff ects were estimated, which were signifi cant at 
the 1 % level. The worse the grade point average, the more likely students were to 
report intentions to attend a university of applied sciences, to obtain one or both 
qualifi cations (DBL), to pursue vocational training or no further education rath-
er than a university education. However, the probability of belonging to the DBL 
group might decrease with lower grades, since the coeffi  cient for DBL vs. univer-
sity education (0.43) is considerably smaller than the coeffi  cients for university of 
applied sciences and vocational training vs. university education (0.83, and 1.22).
According to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the impact of individual risk preference 
should vary with respect to social origin. Therefore, we reran Model 1 with sub-
samples containing students with higher-educated parents and lower-educated par-
ents separately. Model 2, which is based on students with highly educated parents 
(CASMIN 3a and 3b), does not show any signifi cant coeffi  cient for individual risk 
preference. By contrast, Model 3 for students whose parents possess no tertiary ed-
ucation reveals three statistically signifi cant (at least at the 10 % level) eff ects. The 
more risk-seeking a student from lower background is, the more likely this student 
is to pursue a university education and the less likely the student is to pursue VET 
or to belong to the DBL group. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b claim diff erences in the eff ect of school performance on 
educational pathway intentions. In Model 2, the coeffi  cient in the comparison of 
vocational training and education vs. university is signifi cant at the 5 % level; all 
other coeffi  cients estimated for the other three comparisons are considerably lower 
or not signifi cant. In the case of students from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
(Model 3), all four coeffi  cients are highly signifi cant at the 1 % level. 
We used the estimates of Model 2 and 3 to illustrate the results for the main 
features of interest, namely individual risk preference, parental education and 
school performance, by calculating the probabilities. The calculations are based on 
the reference categories of the other variables. The probabilities refer to a male stu-
dent from a family with average disposable income living in Western Germany. 
Vanessa Obermeier & Thorsten Schneider
120 JERO, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2015)
Figure 3:  Intended educational pathway by grade and risk preference for students with 
highly educated parents (CASMIN 3b, left-hand column) and low-educated par-
ents (right-hand column)
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Note. Source: SOEP 2003-12, 17-year-olds, predictions based on Model 2 and 3, Table 2, calculated for a 
male youth in Western Germany surveyed in 2008. UNI: university; UAS: university of applied sciences; 
DBL: sequence of VET + tertiary education; VET: vocational education and training; NOQ: no further train-
ing.
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Figure 3 displays the educational intentions of students with highly educated par-
ents (CASMIN 3b) on the left-hand side and those with less-educated parents on 
the right-hand side. The rows are ordered by students’ school performance, start-
ing with the highest (with a 1.0 grade point average according to the German grad-
ing system) and ending with rather low performers (4.0). The x-axis of each graph 
indicates the individual risk preference, ranging from risk-averse (0) to risk-seek-
ing (10). The shaded areas display the proportion of students who intend to follow 
each of the diff erent educational pathways. The dotted area represents those in-
tending to enroll in university, the diagonal shaded area those intending to enroll 
in a university of applied sciences, the area with vertical lines represents those in-
tending to obtain a dual qualifi cation or still undecided, the black, inverse dotted 
area those intending to enroll in VET, and the grey shaded area to those intending 
to leave the educational system after graduation. 
The left column of Figure 3 shows that the majority of students of highly edu-
cated parents intend to enroll at university even if their grades are poor. However, 
the proportion of students aiming for other forms of higher education increases 
as school performance declines. The fi gures might give the impression that risk-
seeking students are less inclined to attend university. As already mentioned above, 
Model 2 does not reveal any statistical signifi cant infl uence of risk preference. 
Looking at the right-hand column, students at Gymnasium whose school per-
formance is high are overwhelmingly inclined to attend university immediately af-
ter graduation, even those whose parents are less educated. The large majority of 
these students do not intend to enroll in VET or a university of applied sciences. 
The latter forms of education become more and more popular as school perfor-
mance declines. In addition, there is a pronounced relationship between individu-
al risk preference and educational intentions in the right-hand column. The more 
risk-seeking a student from a lower socio-economic background is, the more often 
he or she reports aspiring to attend university.
In addition, we calculated average marginal eff ects (AME) (see Table 2). The 
AME support the fi ndings from Figure 2.3 The intention to enroll at university var-
ies only by individual risk preference in the group of students from lower socio-
economic backgrounds, and grades are much more important in this group than in 
the group from higher backgrounds. 
What does this mean for the relative risk preference hypothesis? Future educa-
tional intentions vary considerably for students with lower academic performance 
by parental education. Students whose parents have both not completed a univer-
sity degree more often mention non-university training, while poorly performing 
students from families in which at least one parent holds a university degree still 
mainly favor university. These results support the notion of relative risk-seeking in 
upper social classes and relative risk aversion in lower classes.
3 In the multinomial logistic regression models (MLMN) the AME can be zero but strongly 
infl uential as the eff ects are non-linear. Long (1997, p. 164) writes in his infl uential book: 
“Not surprisingly, the marginal is rarely used for the MNLM”. As a consequence, we give 
more attention to the predicted probabilities displayed in Figure 3 than to the AME.
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In a next step, we tested whether our fi rst impression of the diff ering impor-
tance of individual risk preference and school performance by family background 
can be validated with rigorous statistical techniques. We therefore modeled inter-
action terms. The dependent variable in its current form has fi ve outcomes with 
relatively low case numbers except the university option. Interaction terms for 
outcomes with low case numbers are diffi  cult to estimate. Because of this, we col-
lapsed the dependent variable into a dichotomous variable, consisting of university 
(still coded as 0) and all other options (coded as 1).
We estimated four binary logistic regression models. Model 4 contains all varia-
bles already used in Model 1. Model 5 takes interaction terms into account between 
risk preference and family background, Model 6 between grades and family back-
ground. Finally, Model 7 contains all interaction terms together (see Table 3). 
For students from lower-class families, it is fairly clear that a higher willingness 
to take risks reduces their intentions to opt for educational options below universi-
ty (including the option of no higher education at all). If parents have a university 
degree (CASMIN 3b), the main eff ect of individual risk preference (-0.18 in Model 
5 and -0.22 in Model 7, the corresponding AME are 4 percentage points) is com-
pletely cancelled out (0.27 and 0.32, the corresponding AME are 5 or 6 percentage 
points). The interaction eff ects are highly signifi cant. At the same time, the main 
eff ects of having parents who completed university education is negative and sig-
nifi cant, indicating a higher interest in attending university for these students. The 
interaction eff ects for CASMIN 3b students with individual risk preference are pos-
itive as well but not signifi cant.
In the case of grade point average, we found a positive main eff ect, indicating 
that students with lower school performance are less likely to consider university 
after fi nishing secondary education. The interaction eff ects of GPA and parental ed-
ucation (CASMIN 3a and 3b) are negative in Models 6 and 7, relaxing the strong 
relationship between grades and the intention to attend university. All interaction 
eff ects are at least signifi cant at the 10 % level. To sum up, the results presented in 
Table 3 strongly support our Hypotheses 2a, b and 3a, b. 
A few short remarks should be made about our control variables. The educa-
tional pathways diff er with regard to their direct and indirect costs. Consequently, 
we incorporated the parental fi nancial situation into all models. In the separate 
models, Models 2 and 3 in Table 2, only in the case of highly educated parents do 
we observe signifi cant eff ects. Especially for students whose parents both have a 
university education, we observe that the better the parental fi nancial situation is, 
the less frequently the students intend to enroll in a university of applied scienc-
es, VET, or no further training at all, and the more frequently they intend to enroll 
in university.
The lack of signifi cant results for the fi nancial situation in the case of students 
from lower classes is unexpected from a theoretical viewpoint.
The control variables on gender and region are in line with previous fi ndings: 
Young women and East Germans are less likely to enter university and more like-
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ly to opt for vocational training. Finally, we see hardly any changes in educational 
plans over diff erent student cohorts.4 
6. Summary and conclusion
The notions of risk aversion and of educational choice as a risky decision are gain-
ing prominence in the sociological literature on inequality in educational op-
portunity (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Davies et al., 2002; Tieben, 2011; van de 
Werfhorst & Hofstede, 2007; Breen, van de Werfhorst, & Meier Jæger, 2014). In 
light of the gaps identifi ed in the previous explanations and depictions, we have 
discussed prospect theory both generally and specifi cally in the case of education-
al decisions. Our most important theoretical fi nding is that the popular notion of 
relative risk aversion in the sociology of education, which is based on the class po-
sition of the parents, appears implausible. Upper social classes are not relatively 
risk-averse; rather, they are relatively risk-seeking. This fi nding is in line with re-
cently published work on educational decision-making under doubt (Breen et al., 
2014). In an additional step, we examined individual risk preference in explaining 
social inequality in educational choice. We argued that in higher social classes in-
dividual risk preference should play a smaller role, as decisions of children from 
these families are infl uenced mainly by status maintenance. The same should hold 
true for school performance. Furthermore, with reference to the existing literature, 
we argued that social background and individual risk preference are correlated and 
this relationship might explain at least to some degree social inequality in educa-
tional opportunity. 
To obtain empirical insights on the importance of risk preference, we investi-
gated students’ intentions to pursue vocational and higher education, focusing on 
those attending the German Gymnasium, which awards graduates with a gener-
al university entrance qualifi cation (Abitur). These students are a highly selective 
group: Most of them attend the Gymnasium from the fi fth grade (about the age of 
ten) onwards. University education can be considered the logical continuation of 
this academically oriented educational pathway.
The fi ndings give some indication that the motive of status maintenance leads 
to both relative risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior, depending on students’ so-
cio-economic backgrounds, and that this infl uences their further educational path-
ways. With respect to parental education, which is linked to the family’s social sta-
tus, there are clear diff erences in students’ intentions to attend university. These 
diff erences are particularly evident for students with poor school performance. 
Regarding individual risk preference, we argued that risk-averse Gymnasium 
students should have a lower tendency to pursue a university education and in-
stead intend to complete VET. Referring to the model of educational choice, we 
4 If we specify cohort dummies for every single year instead of one linear variable in Table 
3, there are also no siginifi cant eff ects. 
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argued that these patterns should only be observable for students at Gymnasium 
with non-university-educated parents, because otherwise, the motive of status 
maintenance would predominate. The empirical fi ndings provide evidence in fa-
vor of our argument: Individual risk preference proved to be infl uential only for 
students with non-university-educated parents. The more risk-seeking these young 
people are, the more likely they are to pursue a university education. Finally, the 
lack of empirical evidence on a relationship between the risk preference of students 
from higher socio-economic backgrounds and their vocational and higher educa-
tional intentions can be interpreted, again, as indicating the importance of the mo-
tive of status maintenance. 
We did not fi nd support for the idea that students diff er signifi cantly in their 
individual risk preferences at age 17. However, we have to consider that we have 
a highly selective population. The students under examination attended the high-
est secondary school track, Gymnasium, which represents only about one-third of 
their birth cohort (see Section 2). 
It should be kept in mind that our study has its limitations. Since our analy-
sis is restricted to the 17-year-olds who were attending a Gymnasium at the time 
of the survey, this study is not about fi nal or even realized educational decisions 
but about intentions for further education. Also, as elaborated above, we imput-
ed the data set and used a non-experimental measure of individual risk preference. 
It could also be argued that a more specifi c assessment of risk preferences, for ex-
ample in the context of educational and occupational decisions, would increase the 
explanatory power of the statistical models. From a theoretical point of view, how-
ever, we prefer the non-specifi c risk measure as it refl ects a more general trait and 
can be more clearly diff erentiated from relative risk preference in a specifi c do-
main. More studies are clearly needed to analyze risk preferences in the context of 
educational choices. In addition, we relied on grades alone as an indicator of suc-
cess probability. Results of cognitive competence tests and self-rated success prob-
ability would be desirable.
To conclude, previous research has shown that various dimensions of person-
ality, attitudes and preferences infl uence diff erent aspects of educational success, 
and our fi ndings provide further support for this idea. However, aspects such as 
preferences and personal attitudes are obviously not independent of sociologically 
relevant categories such as socio-economic status, immigrant background or gen-
der, and should therefore be integrated into both theoretical models and popula-
tion surveys. 
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Appendix 1
Table A1:  Frequency distribution and relative frequencies of diff erent intentions regarding 
further education (before imputation)
Proportion pursuing Missing
Frequency UNI UAS DBL VET NOQ value
Frequency distribution 1,154 728 88 139 115 63 21
Relative frequencies 100 % 63 % 8 % 12 % 10 % 5 % 2 %
Risk preferencea
< = 3.5 (very low) 70 71 % 4 % 7 % 7 % 6 % 4 %
4 to 5 155 59 % 10 % 13 % 14 % 4 % 0 %
6 104 68 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 6 % 3 %
7 96 67 % 5 % 17 % 5 % 5 % 1 %
> 7.5 (very high) 59 59 % 15 % 10 % 10 % 5 % 0 %
Missing value 670 62 % 7 % 13 % 10 % 6 % 2 %
Risk preferencea at least 
one point of measure
< = 3.5 (very low) 154 68 % 6 % 11 % 8 % 5 % 3 %
4 to 5 374 56 % 8 % 14 % 15 % 5 % 2 %
6 208 66 % 10 % 10 % 8 % 4 % 2 %
7 193 68 % 5 % 14 % 5 % 7 % 1 %
> 7.5 (very high) 193 65 % 9 % 9 % 9 % 7 % 2 %
Missing value 32 56 % 6 % 9 % 13 % 9 % 6 %
Parental education
CASMIN 1 75 55 % 11 % 8 % 17 % 7 % 3 %
CASMIN 2 396 50 % 9 % 16 % 16 % 5 % 3 %
CASMIN 3a 174 65 % 9 % 11 % 9 % 5 % 1 %
CASMIN 3b 508 74 % 6 % 9 % 5 % 6 % 1 %
Missing value 1 100 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Grade point averagea
< = 2.0 (excellent) 233 79 % 4 % 9 % 4 % 4 % 0 %
2.33-2.66 379 70 % 6 % 12 % 8 % 4 % 0 %
3.0-3.33 346 53 % 9 % 15 % 13 % 6 % 3 %
> = 3.66 (poor) 187 48 % 12 % 10 % 17 % 9 % 4 %
Missing value 9 44 % 33 % 0 % 0 % 11 % 11 %
Household incomea
1st quartile 280 51 % 11 % 14 % 16 % 6 % 2 %
2nd quartile 295 59 % 11 % 11 % 12 % 4 % 3 %
3rd quartile 287 66 % 6 % 14 % 8 % 5 % 0 %
4th quartile 290 76 % 3 % 9 % 4 % 6 % 2 %
missing value 2 50 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 50 % 0 %
Region
West 908 66 % 7 % 11 % 8 % 6 % 2 %
East 246 52 % 9 % 17 % 17 % 4 % 2 %
Gender
Boy 545 65 % 9 % 10 % 8 % 6 % 2 %
Girl 609 61 % 7 % 14 % 11 % 5 % 2 %
Note. Source: SOEP 2003–2012. Own calculations. UNI: university; UAS: university of applied sciences; 
DBL: sequence of VET + tertiary education or undecided; VET: vocational education and training; NOQ: 
no further training.
aPut into larger categories for descriptive statistics only.
